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Competition Law—What Next?
Roger W. Fones*
I. INTRODUCTION
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* Senior Of Counsel, Morrison Foerster.
“Legacy” airlines refer to the large, full-service carriers that existed prior to deregulation in the
United States.
2 Robert Wall, Europe’s Airlines May Be Readying for New, U.S.-Style Merger Round, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 17, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/09/17/europes-airlinesmay-be-readying-for-new-u-s-style-merger-round/.
3 Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., Docket No. OST-2007-28644 (Dep’t of Transp. May 22,
2008) (final order); see also infra Part IV, discussing alliances and code sharing.
4 America Airlines, Inc., Docket No. DOT-OST-2008-0252 (Dep’t of Transp. July 20, 2010) (final
order).
5 U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, Docket No. DOT-OST-2010-0059 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 10, 2010)
(final order).
1
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During the last decade, there has been an increase in airline industry
consolidation, both within the United States domestically as well as abroad.
In the U.S., six of the remaining “legacy” network airlines1 consolidated into
three, and some low cost point-to-point carriers have merged as well. Among
legacy carriers, Northwest and Delta merged in 2008, United and Continental
in 2010, and most recently, American and US Airways in 2013. In 2011,
major low cost carriers Southwest and AirTran also merged. On the
international front, Air France and KLM merged in 2004, Lufthansa acquired
SN Brussels and Austrian Airlines in 2009, British Airways and Iberia
merged in 2011, and Delta acquired forty-nine percent of Virgin Atlantic in
2013. A Wall Street Journal blog speculated that the European airline
industry might be poised for its own round of “U.S.-Style” consolidation.2
During that same time period, additional consolidations have been
accomplished through joint ventures, alliances, and code sharing, often
accompanied by grants of immunity from U.S. antitrust laws by the U.S.
Department of Transportation (USDOT). In 2008, USDOT granted statutory
antitrust immunity (ATI) to a joint venture and alliance among Delta/
Northwest, Air France/KLM, Alitalia, and Czech Airlines to operate jointly
between the United States and Europe.3 In 2010, USDOT did the same for
American, British Airways, Iberia, Finnair, and Royal Jordanian.4 For travel
between the United States and Japan, USDOT issued ATI separately for
American and JAL to coordinate their service, and for United/Continental to
coordinate with All Nippon Airways.5 And in 2013, USDOT granted ATI to
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Delta, Virgin Atlantic, Air France/KLM and Alitalia to operate jointly
between North America and the United Kingdom.6
There is no better way to anticipate how the enforcement authorities will
treat future consolidations than to understand what they have said and done
in the past. Over the years, the major enforcement authorities, particularly in
the United States and Europe, have been relatively transparent about their
analytical approach to airline consolidations. Moreover, the analytics do not
vary much by agency or type of consolidation (e.g., merger, asset acquisition,
joint venture). Although this article refers primarily to government
enforcement in the United States, other competition authorities, particularly
that of the European Union, have applied a similar analytical paradigm for
mergers and consolidations in the airline industry and elsewhere.7
II. COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

6
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Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., Docket No. DOT-OST-2013-0068 (Dep’t of Transp. Sept. 23,
2013) (final order).
7 See, e.g., 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5 [hereinafter EU Guidelines].
8 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2014) (“No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of
the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock
by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.”).
9 “The intended commercial effects of the ATI Applicants’ respective joint venture agreements are
similar to those resulting from a merger. As part of our overall analysis, we apply the Clayton Act test,
which is used to predict the competitive effects of a proposed merger.” U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, supra
note 5, at 3.
10 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & F.T.C., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
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The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ)
enforces the U.S. antitrust laws in the airline and other industries. Mergers,
acquisitions, and other consolidations in the airline industry are governed by
the same substantive standards that apply to other industries, principally the
standards set forth in section 7 of the Clayton Act.8 USDOT also applies the
Clayton Act standards when analyzing the competitive effects of proposed
international consolidations for ATI applications.9
USDOJ’s substantive antitrust analysis of proposed airline
consolidations follows the general analytical paradigm set forth in the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Merger Guidelines) issued jointly by USDOJ
and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.10 The steps in the review are to: (A)
identify the relevant market(s) potentially affected by the transaction; (B)
assess pre-and post-merger concentration in each of those markets; (C)
evaluate the likely competitive effects of the merger, including (D) the
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likelihood of new entry; and finally to (E) consider any merger-specific
efficiencies of the transaction that might offset any competitive harm. There
also may be “failing firm” issues to consider, which might permit an
otherwise anticompetitive consolidation to proceed.11
A. Relevant Markets
The first step in merger analysis under competition laws is to define the
“relevant market” (or markets) affected by consolidation. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that defining a relevant market is necessary because any effect
of the consolidation on competition can be determined only with respect to a
relevant market.12 USDOJ methodology for defining relevant markets uses
the hypothetical monopolist test as set forth in the Merger Guidelines.13
Following Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Guidelines refer to defining both
a product market (“line of commerce”) and a geographic market (“section of
the country”).14 These two concepts tend to converge in the airline industry,
however, with USDOJ normally concluding that air travel between any given
origin city and destination city (i.e., a “city pair”) is the appropriate relevant
market for analyzing airline mergers. USDOJ reasons that a passenger who
wants to fly from Washington, D.C. to San Francisco for a business meeting
or a vacation will not view a flight from Washington, D.C., to Minneapolis
as a reasonable substitute if fares to San Francisco increase. The courts and
USDOT are generally in accord.15
1. City or Airport Pairs

11
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See infra Part II.F.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
13 The hypothetical monopolist test posits a monopoly supplier of a group of products or services
in a candidate relevant market and asks whether it could profitably implement a “small but significant and
non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP). The smallest group of products or services that satisfies the
hypothetical monopolist test constitutes a relevant product or service market. Merger Guidelines, supra
note 10, at § 4.1.
14 See supra note 8.
15 See, e.g., Malaney v. UAL Corp., 434 F. App’x 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2011) (“national market in air
travel” improper; flights from San Francisco to Newark are not interchangeable with flights from Seattle
to Miami); America Airlines, Inc., Docket No. DOT-OST-2008-0252, 18 (Dep’t of Transp. Feb. 13, 2010)
(show cause order) (“[R]elevant markets in the airline industry are transportation between city pairs.
Demand is specific to city pairs; if the price of travel in City Pair A increases by a significant amount,
consumers would not generally consider substituting travel in City Pair B.”).
12
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While USDOJ typically views city pairs as the appropriate relevant
markets in the airline industry, issues sometimes arise when multiple airports
serve a single metropolitan area, as is the case in Washington D.C., New York
City, Tokyo, and London. The question then becomes whether a hypothetical
monopolist of flights from one airport, for instance, Washington Dulles
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International Airport, could raise fares without losing a significant number of
passengers to alternate airports, such as Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport (Washington National) or Baltimore/Washington International
Thurgood Marshall Airport.
2. Time-sensitive Travelers and Nonstop Service
The relevant market may be narrower than all scheduled airline service
in a city pair. USDOJ has frequently maintained that nonstop service is a
separate market from connecting service for a group of “time-sensitive”
travelers—those passengers who would not switch to connecting service if
the cost of nonstop service went up five or ten percent. In the early days of
deregulation, some carriers with overlapping hubs merged. This involved
numerous nonstop overlaps, which USDOJ opposed on that basis. More
recently, USDOJ has focused on nonstop service overlaps for travel between
the merging parties’ hubs, referred to as “hub-to-hub” markets.16
3. Connecting Service Overlaps

4. Airport Access
A single airport also may be considered a relevant market when the
transaction involves gates, or slots, at “constrained” airports.19 USDOJ has a

C M
Y K
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16 In announcing its challenge of United Airlines’ proposed acquisition of US Airways in 2001, the
USDOJ cited to, among other concerns, the loss of competition on the hub-to-hub nonstop routes of the
parties. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dep’t of Justice & Several States Will Sue to Stop United
Airlines from Acquiring US Airways (July 27, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2001/8701.htm.
17 Amended Complaint at 44, United States v. US Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-01236
(D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) ECF No. 73, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f300400/300479.pdf.
18 Id.
19 “Constrained” airports are those where the demand from carriers who want to serve the airport
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USDOJ will also look at one-stop overlaps if the merging parties are the
dominant one-stop carriers on a significant number of city pairs. To identify
potentially problematic one-stop city pair overlaps, DOJ will apply a traffic
data screen. For example, a “50/5” screen would identify city pairs in which
the merging carriers combined had at least fifty percent of the passengers,
and the smaller carrier had at least five percent. In Appendix A to its 2013
amended complaint against the US Airways-American Airlines merger,
USDOJ listed over one-thousand overlap city pairs where the merger was
“presumed” illegal, the vast majority of which were one-stop overlaps.17 In
addition, USDOJ also assesses whether one-stop service provided by one
party is the next best substitute to nonstop service offered by the other party.
Appendix A included a number of these overlaps as well.18
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exceeds the capacity of the airport, such as London Heathrow, Chicago O’Hare, or Washington National.
20 In 1989, USDOJ challenged Eastern Airlines’ proposals to sell eight gates at gate-constrained
Philadelphia International Airport to USAir, which already operated a hub at that airport in competition
with Eastern’s hub. In 1991, USDOJ challenged Eastern’s proposed sale of slots and gates at Washington
National Airport to United, which operated what USDOJ considered a competing hub out of nearby Dulles
International Airport. See Competition in the Airline Industry, at 2 (1999), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/2294.pdf (testimony of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
21 Complaint at ¶ 90, United States v. US Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-01236 (D.D.C., Aug.
13, 2013) ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f299900/299968.pdf.
22 Any member of the public may file comments on proposed FAA actions, and the USDOJ
frequently files comments at other federal agencies when government action affecting competition is
proposed. USDOJ’s “competition advocacy” comments filed with FAA, USDOT, and other federal
agencies are available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/comments.html.
23
United States Department of Justice, Comments of the United States Department of Justice
Before the Federal Aviation Administration Department of Transportation, Docket No. FAA-2010-0109
at 5-6 (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/04/14/
257463.pdf.
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long history of scrutinizing gate and slot acquisitions by dominant carriers at
constrained airports.20 An airport may be constrained on airside capacity (a
slot system has been established), groundside capacity (gates are fully leased
with no ability to expand the number of gates rapidly), or both, so that new
entry or expansion by incumbents at that airport is not feasible within a
reasonable period of time.
In 2013, one of the bases for USDOJ’s lawsuit challenging the US
Airways/American Airlines merger was the increase in slot concentration at
Washington National Airport that would occur as a result of the merger.
According to USDOJ’s complaint, US Airways’ share of slots at Washington
National would go from fifty-five percent to sixty-nine percent, and would
eliminate existing and future head-to-head competition between the parties,
effectively blocking other airlines’ competitive entry or expansion at
Washington National.21
In 2010, USDOJ investigated the proposed slot swap between US
Airways and Delta at Washington National and New York LaGuardia that
would have increased each party’s already large share of slots at the
respective airports. USDOJ did not challenge the US Airways/Delta slot
swap under the antitrust laws; rather, it decided to file comments at the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),22 which administers slots
nationwide and has separate legal authority to approve, disapprove, or
conditionally approve the transaction. According to USDOJ, the transaction
would have increased US Airways’ slot share at Washington National from
forty-four percent to fifty-four percent and Delta’s share at LaGuardia from
twenty-four percent to forty-nine percent.23 The FAA had proposed to
approve the transaction subject to divestiture by the parties of forty slots at
LaGuardia and twenty at Washington National. USDOJ filed comments in
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support of the FAA’s proposal, concluding that the divestitures would resolve
its competitive concerns.24 The parties decided not to proceed with their
transaction subject to those conditions but later reformulated the transaction
and agreed to divest thirty-two slots at LaGuardia and sixteen at Washington
National. The FAA approved the reformulated transaction in 2011.25
B. Concentration

24
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Id. at 2–3.
Delta Airlines Inc., Docket No. FAA-2010-0109 at 5-6 (FAA Oct. 13, 2011) (notice of grant of
petition with conditions).
26 Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at § 5.3.
27 EU Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part III, ¶20.
28 See e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 31–32, United States v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 1998) (listing two-to-one overlap routes and routes served only by Northwest, but
for which Continental had a hub at the opposite end point).
25
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The Merger Guidelines and the EU Guidelines advise that market shares
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration are
calculated pre and post-transaction. The HHI is the sum of the squares of the
market shares of the competitors in the relevant market and, thus, gives more
weight to firms with larger market shares. Market shares may be measured in
revenue (ticket sales), units sold (passengers), or capacity (seats or flights
operated). The Merger Guidelines classify markets with an HHI under 1500
as “unconcentrated” and over 2500 as “highly concentrated,” and presume
that a merger that increases the HHI by more than 200 points in a “highly
concentrated” market is likely to enhance market power.26 The EU is unlikely
to challenge a merger with a post-merger HHI below 2000 with an increase
less than 250 or above 2000 if the increase is less than 150, unless special
circumstances are present.27 A duopoly route of two equal-size carriers would
have an HHI of 5000 and a four-to-three-merger resulting in equal-size
carriers would have a post-merger HHI of 3333.
For nonstop overlaps, USDOJ practice in the airline industry often has
been to count the number of carriers that are currently providing the relevant
service or are well-positioned to provide it. Once a carrier is deemed able to
provide the service, such as by having a hub at one of the end points, it is
normally considered an easy matter for that carrier to add and subtract
capacity on a route. As a result, snapshots of passenger or revenue shares on
the route are not necessarily meaningful. Accordingly, city pairs that are
impacted by a proposed consolidation have been categorized as “two-to-one”
or “three-to-two,” etc.28
For one-stop or other connecting overlaps, USDOJ has examined
whether the parties’ connecting hubs are particularly well-positioned to
provide connecting service on a city pair. In announcing its challenge of
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United’s proposed acquisition of US Airways, USDOJ noted that the parties’
East Coast hubs made them “the only two airlines, or two of only three
airlines, offering connecting service between [various East Coast city
pairs].”29 And again in its 2013 complaint against the US Airways/American
Airlines merger, USDOJ included an appendix that listed post-merger HHIs,
measured in ticket revenue, and the changes in them, for over one-thousand
city-pair markets affected, most of which were connecting markets.30 Each
of the listed city pairs had a post-merger HHI greater than 2500, an increase
in its HHI of over 200, and was a city pair where the merger was
“presumptively illegal” according to the complaint.
C. Competitive Effects

See supra note 16.
Complaint at App. A, United States v. US Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-01236 (D.D.C.
Aug. 13, 2013) ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f299900/299968.pdf.
31 Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at §§ 6-7; EU Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part IV, ¶ 22.
30
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Identifying city pairs where a consolidation will result in a potentially
problematic level of concentration is an important but not dispositive step.
The next step is to determine what the likely effect of the increased
concentration will be on prices and output. Enforcement authorities have
identified two possible means by which consumers can be harmed with price
increases or output reductions resulting from a merger: “unilateral” effects
and “coordinated” effects.31
Unilateral effects arise when competition between the products of the
merging firms is eliminated, allowing the merged entity to unilaterally
exercise market power, for instance, by profitably raising the price of one or
both merging parties’ products, thus, harming consumers. In markets for
relatively undifferentiated products (e.g., commodities or other fungible
products or services), unilateral effects are more likely when two significant
competitors merge to create a dominant seller. In markets for undifferentiated
products or services, enforcement authorities will look primarily at market
shares and the capacity currently available in the market. In differentiated
product mergers, that is, where the merging parties’ products compete but are
imperfect substitutes (e.g., automobiles), unilateral effect concerns arise
when the two merging companies’ products are particularly close substitutes
in the eyes of consumers—the closer the substitutability, the greater the
concern about unilateral effects. Scheduled airline service does not
necessarily fit neatly into either category, and the enforcement agencies will
likely consider both possibilities.
Coordinated effects arise if the merger could increase the probability
that, post-merger, merging parties and their competitors will successfully be
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32 See generally Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at §7.2; EU Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part
IV, ¶¶ 39-57.
33 The existence of a “hub premium” in fares has not escaped the attention of savvy travel agents
and others. In 1996, a class of air travelers sued under the antitrust laws a group of major carriers who
refused to sell so-called “hidden city” tickets. The “hidden city” practice involved the passenger
purchasing a lower-priced one-stop ticket that connected at the carrier’s hub, deplaning at the hub and
simply discarding the unused portion of the ticket. See, e.g., In re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208
F.R.D. 174 (E.D. Mich. 2002). While travelers may have considered the practice a clever form of arbitrage,
carriers viewed it as fraudulent, and have battled the practice for years. Nevertheless, the practice remains
and continues to be contentious. See, e.g., Patrick Gillespie, Why Is United Airlines Suing a 22-year-old?,
CNN MONEY (Dec. 31, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/29/news/united-orbitz-sueskiplagged-22/.
34 See, e.g., supra note 16.

37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 53 Side B

able to coordinate their behavior, or better coordinate their behavior, in an
anti-competitive way, for example, by raising prices. The primary task of
enforcers is to determine whether market characteristics exist that make
coordination easier, such as market transparency, product homogeneity, and
numerous small transactions with buyers. Anticompetitive coordination is
more likely to emerge in markets where it is relatively simple for sellers to
agree on how they will coordinate. In addition, for coordination to be
sustainable, the coordinating firms must be able to monitor each other to
assure themselves that others are not cheating on the agreement, and there
must be some form of credible punishment mechanism if deviation is
detected. Further, the reactions of outsiders, such as current and future
competitors not participating in the coordination, as well as customers,
should not be able to defeat the coordination.32
In the past, USDOJ has concluded that anticompetitive coordination
among firms in the airline industry is possible and has in fact occurred.
Empirical research conducted by USDOJ economists and others has
supported these conclusions about coordinated effects in the airline industry.
The airline industry is data-rich, and USDOJ collects traffic data from
USDOT, the parties, and other sources in order to measure the correlation
between concentration (the number of carriers, market shares, or HHIs) and
fare levels across city pairs. USDOJ has consistently found that fares for
nonstop service are higher when there are fewer nonstop carriers on a route,
which indicates that nonstop fares are constrained by other nonstop service,
but not by connecting service, at least not until the fare differential or distance
traveled, and, hence, the time of travel becomes large.33
In the past, USDOJ has also examined whether two merging airlines are
often the first and second best-positioned bidders for a significant number of
corporate or government travel contracts.34 This inquiry includes an overlap
city-pair analysis, but also looks at whether the two carriers’ entire networks,
including service amenities, schedule frequencies, and international service
or alliances, make them particularly attractive alternatives to one another
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given the demands of large corporate (or government) customers.
D. Entry

E. Efficiencies
Under the Merger Guidelines, DOJ also considers the efficiencies that
35
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Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at § 9.
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires US Airways and
American Airlines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance System-Wide Competition and
Settle Merger Challenge (Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/
2013/301616.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United Airlines and Continental Airlines Transfer
Assets to Southwest Airlines in Response to Department of Justice’s Antitrust Concerns (Aug. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/262002.pdf; and Press Release, Eur.
Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Clears Proposed Takeover of Austrian Airlines by Lufthansa, Subject to
Conditions
(Aug.
28,
2009),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-091255_en.htm?locale=fr.
36
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The prospect of new entry (that is, entry induced by the merger) may be
sufficient to alleviate competitive concerns if the entry would be timely,
likely, and sufficient to counteract an anticompetitive fare increase in the
relevant market.35 At one time, hub economics were so powerful that it was
rare for one carrier to enter a city pair with another carrier’s hub at one end
point, except from its own hub. More recently, the proliferation of low cost
carriers (LCCs) offering point-to-point service has increased the number of
city pairs where point-to-point entry is economically feasible. At the same
time, legacy carriers have lowered their cost structures, through bankruptcy
and otherwise, to reduce their cost disadvantage relative to LCCs. The effect
of lower costs is that legacies are now better able to enter some non-hub
markets on a point-to-point basis. USDOJ asks whether the new entrant
would be profitable at premerger prices, placing significant weight on the
prior history of entry in city pairs in response to an increase in fares or
margins in that market. USDOJ still considers it likely that a carrier will enter
a spoke emanating from its hub, but it also realizes that a legacy carrier may
well enter routes to and from any city where it has significant service and
brand identity. Nevertheless, there remain many thin connecting routes
between smaller cities that are likely only servable by a hub-and-spoke
network carrier.
One entry barrier that frequently comes up in airline consolidations is
airport access at slot-constrained airports. Slot constraints, by definition,
mean that there are carriers who would like to enter or expand their service
at an airport, but cannot because they lack slots (and/or gates or other ground
facilities). A number of airline consolidations in the United States and Europe
have been allowed to proceed when the merging parties agreed to divest slots
at constrained airports to competitors.36

37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 54 Side B

01/11/2016 08:19:25

07 - FONES_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

FIU Law Review

456

1/4/16 6:29 PM

[Vol. 10:447

result from a proposed merger or acquisition, but it only gives weight to those
efficiencies that are “merger-specific” (i.e., unlikely to happen in the absence
of the merger), well-defined, and reasonably substantiated.37 Even those
cognizable efficiencies are likely to make a difference only when the
expected adverse competitive effects (absent the efficiencies) are not great.38
Among the efficiencies that USDOJ has favorably considered in connection
with proposed airline mergers and acquisitions, are the merged carrier’s
ability to provide improved online service to more destinations, cost savings
in airport operations, information technology, fleet optimization, and supply
chain economics, all to the benefit of consumers.39 Under the EU Guidelines,
efficiencies must benefit consumers, be merger-specific, and be verifiable.40
F. Failing Firms and Assets
A transaction that might initially appear to be anticompetitive may be
allowed to proceed if the parties demonstrate that one of the parties is a
“failing firm.” The failing firm defense is well established in U.S. antitrust
law and applies to the airline industry in the same manner as other
industries.41 The basic policy underlying the defense is that an otherwise
anticompetitive acquisition will not harm competition or consumers if the
firm and its assets would exit the relevant market(s) without the transaction.
The key elements of the failing firm defense are:

Both USDOJ and the EU have applied the failing firm doctrine in the airline

37
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Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at § 10.
Id.
39 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Assistant Att’y Gen. R. Hewitt Pate
Regarding the Closing of the America West/US Airways Investigation (June 23, 2005), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/209709.pdf; and Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of
the Merger of Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corporation (Oct. 29, 2008), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/238849.pdf.
40 EU Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part VII, ¶78.
41 “[W]here the evidence suggests a failing firm will not be able successfully to reorganize, we
agree it may be better to be acquired by a competitor than to suffer liquidation. A good example of this is
American Airlines’ acquisition of its competitor TWA, which was bankrupt, out of money, and without
another buyer.” See Antitrust for Airlines, at 9, Before the Reg’l Airline Ass’n President’s Council Meeting
(2005) (remarks by J. Bruce McDonald Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of Justice),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/217987.pdf.
38

37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 54 Side B

• Imminent failure of the firm (or a subsidiary, division, or
group of assets);
• The firm cannot successfully reorganize in bankruptcy or
otherwise; and
• There is no reasonable less anticompetitive purchaser for the
firm or assets.
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III. PARTIAL ACQUISITIONS
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42 Id.; Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition of Greek Airline
Olympic Air by Aegean Airlines (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13927_en.htm; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces It Won’t
Challenge American Airlines/TWA Acquisition (Mar. 16, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/press_releases/2001/7682.htm.
43 Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at §13.
44 Id.
45 Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, United States v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611 (E.D. Mich. Dec.
18, 1998).
46 Id. ¶¶ 2, 3 at 2.
47 Id. ¶ 31 at 10.
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Although most transactions that are the subject of government antitrust
scrutiny involve the acquisition of complete ownership and control, partial
acquisitions—including partial acquisitions in the airline industry—also have
been challenged. The analytic framework that USDOJ uses to analyze partial
acquisitions is described in Section 13 of the Merger Guidelines. If a partial
acquisition gives the acquiring party effective control over the target firm or
involves substantially all of the relevant assets of the target firm, the
transaction is analyzed like a complete acquisition.43 If a partial acquisition
does not result in effective control of the target firm or substantially all of its
relevant assets, then the issue is whether the transaction is likely to lessen
competition (1) by giving the acquiring firm the ability to influence the
competitive conduct of the target firm; (2) by reducing the incentive of either
firm to compete aggressively with the other; or (3) by giving the acquiring
firm access to nonpublic, competitively sensitive information of the target
firm that could facilitate collusive conduct.44
In 1998, USDOJ challenged Northwest Airlines’ partial acquisition of
Continental Airlines. Northwest was then the fourth largest airline in the
United States, and Continental was the fifth largest.45 According to the
amended complaint, Northwest and Continental competed on price and
service in “thousands of routes throughout the United States” and were “each
other’s most significant competitor . . . on seven densely traveled routes
between cities where they operate[d] their hubs—Detroit, Memphis, and
Minneapolis for Northwest; and Cleveland, Houston, and Newark for
Continental.”46 On five of those seven routes their combined share of nonstop
flights was one hundred percent; on the other two it was ninety-three percent
and eighty-three percent, respectively.47
Over a period of several months in 1998, Northwest acquired sufficient
Continental stock to give it fifty-one percent of the voting power over
Continental and the consequent ability to influence virtually all of
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Continental’s management decisions, including decisions regarding its
competitive conduct.48 USDOJ believed that Northwest’s ownership of a
controlling interest in Continental also would reduce the incentive of each
carrier to compete against the other.49 It concluded that Northwest’s partial
acquisition would diminish actual competition in the seven hub-to-hub
markets and in “numerous other markets,” as well as potential competition in
additional key markets, thereby creating the likelihood of increased fares and
decreased service.50
The case ultimately settled during trial. Under the terms of the
settlement, Northwest agreed to divest all but seven percent of the voting
interest in Continental, and to accept significant restrictions on its ability to
vote any stock it retained.51
In December 2012, Delta Air Lines reached an agreement to purchase
the forty-nine percent stake in Virgin Atlantic that was then held by
Singapore Airlines. At that time, Delta and Virgin Atlantic had nonstop
overlaps in two transatlantic markets—New York-London and BostonLondon—and Delta’s one-stop services overlapped with Virgin Atlantic’s
nonstop flights on another ten routes between North America and London
and Birmingham. However, there were other significant competitors on all
of those routes. British Airways and American Airlines, which operate under
a joint venture agreement on North Atlantic routes, were very robust
competitors on the overlapping nonstop routes in particular. Presumably
because Delta did not plan to acquire a majority stake in Virgin Atlantic, and
because other viable airlines would continue to provide competitive
constraints, both EU and US competition authorities determined not to
challenge the proposed transaction.52

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, prohibits conspiracies and
agreements that restrain or eliminate competition.53 Agreements between

48
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Id. ¶¶ 14, 16 at 5.
Id. ¶ 37 at 12.
50 Id. ¶ 38 at 12.
51 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department Announces Tentative Settlement in NorthwestContinental Lawsuit (Nov. 6, 2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2000/
6905.htm.
52
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
on Its Decision To Close Its Investigation of Delta Air Lines’ Acquisition of an Equity Interest in Virgin
Atlantic Airways (June 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/
298788.htm; Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Clears Proposed Joint Acquisition of
Virgin Atlantic by Delta and Virgin Group (June 20, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-13-587_en.htm.
53 “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
49
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direct competitors, such as two airlines serving the same markets, are referred
to as “horizontal” agreements and are normally challenged as restraining
competition between the two parties. Agreements between parties at different
levels of production or distribution, such as between an airline and a travel
agent or corporate client, are referred to as “vertical agreements” and are
normally challenged as exclusionary, that is, as inhibiting competition from
actual or potential competitors of one of the parties.54 In addition, like
participants in other transportation or network industries, airlines can be both
horizontally and vertically related to one another, depending on the situation.
For example, airlines that interline passengers with one another are in a
vertical relationship with respect to that traffic, even though they are direct
competitors for other traffic. Alliances and code sharing agreements may,
therefore, constitute horizontal agreements in some city-pair markets but
vertical agreements in others.
A. Horizontal Agreements
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or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2004).
54 See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (discussing horizontal
and vertical agreements); In re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, n.34 (E.D. Mich.
2002) (discussing horizontal and vertical agreements in the airline industry).
55 The per se rule provides that once a plaintiff establishes that an agreement is of a certain nature
(horizontal price-fixing, bid-rigging, market allocation, and certain group boycotts), the adverse effect on
competition is presumed without detailed examination of market conditions and impact. The per se rule
is reserved for an agreement that “facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1979). Suspected per se conduct will often be investigated by USDOJ as a criminal matter (e.g.,
the air cargo prosecutions).
56 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
57 Id.
58 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972).
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Horizontal agreements have been classified by the U.S. courts as either
“per se illegal” or subject to a “rule of reason” analysis to determine their
legality.55 Rule of reason cases are further subdivided into “quick look” cases
and “full rule of reason” cases.
Any agreement that is not illegal per se is analyzed in the United States
under the rule of reason. The basic test under the rule of reason is whether,
on balance, the restraint “is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition.”56 The rule of reason does not permit a restraint on
competition to be justified by social or other non-competition related
policies.57 The net adverse effect on competition must be significant, rather
than trivial or attenuated.58
Most agreements between or among airlines are subject to a rule of
reason analysis because they are potentially pro-competitive, or at least
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competitively neutral. Common examples include interline agreements,59
alliance agreements, code-sharing, information exchanges, joint ventures of
all sorts, including industry joint ventures,60 and trade associations.61
Domestic code-share alliances are joint ventures between or among
airlines and are subject to the normal operation of the Sherman Act. Like
international alliances, domestic alliances involve agreements on fares
among the parties, sometimes on overlapping routes. USDOJ applies a
standard rule of reason analysis to domestic alliances and may challenge
them in court. By statute, however, a domestic alliance must also be
submitted to USDOT for its review and approval under 49 U.S.C. § 41720 to
determine whether it constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice or unfair
method of competition under 49 U.S.C. § 41712, formerly Section 411 of the
Federal Aviation Act.62 Although USDOJ did not challenge the Delta/
Northwest/Continental domestic alliance under the Sherman Act, USDOT
imposed, at the behest of USDOJ, conditions on its approval under its statute
that limited certain joint pricing activity by the parties.63 Under USDOT’s
approval order:
• No code-sharing is permitted for local traffic on routes
where more than one of the carriers offers nonstop service,
including their hub-to-hub routes.
• Each carrier must act independently in establishing the terms

01/11/2016 08:19:25
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59 An interline agreement allows one carrier to sell an itinerary, or part of an itinerary, on a second
carrier, which commonly occurs when a connecting flight requires two or more different carriers. See
Arpad Szakal, Interline and Code-share Agreements, http://www.aviationlaw.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2013/09/Interline-and-code-share-agreements.pdf (explaining interline and code sharing agreements).
60 Industry-wide joint ventures include the Airlines Tariff Publishing Company (ATP) and the
Airlines Reporting Corporation (ARC). A consumer class action survived summary judgment where the
class alleged that Northwest, Delta and US Airways conspired with ARC to prohibit the sale of “hidden
city” tickets. See generally In re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
The court rejected a “fraud prevention” defense, holding that disclosure of a passenger’s true itinerary was
unilaterally imposed by the carriers and not a bargained-for element of sale for the passenger, and, thus,
the elements of “fraud” were not present. Moreover, the information exchanged added nothing to the
information each carrier possessed about its own passengers, so the exchange “enabled” no fraud
prevention as in Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
61 Industry trade associations include Airlines for America (formerly known as the Air Transport
Association) or the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
62 In theory, international joint ventures and alliances are subject to the normal operation of the
antitrust laws, but in practice, such alliances apply to USDOT for statutory immunity, where the
competitive issues are examined with USDOJ input. See Proposed Final Judgment No. 147-2 at Part IV.C
(Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/818343/amr111213.txt.
63 See Termination of Review Under 49 U.S.C. 41720 of Delta/Northwest/Continental
Agreements, 68 Fed. Reg. 16854 (Apr. 7, 2003), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/
2003/04/07/03-8288/termination-of-review-under-49-usc-41720-of-deltanorthwestcontinentalagreements; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Approves Northwest/
Continental/Delta Marketing Alliance With Conditions (Jan. 17, 2003), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2003/200645.pdf.
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and conditions of its frequent flyer programs and in bidding
on corporate contracts, although the carriers may offer a
customer the option of a joint bid when consistent with the
antitrust laws.
• Each carrier must observe restrictions on the extent to which
it can set prices on flights operated by another carrier.64
B. Vertical Agreements
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64 The marketing carrier’s fares must be the same as the operating carrier’s fares on routes that are
not served by the marketing airline (the marketing airline is the airline that does not operate the flight but
nonetheless sells seats under its code). On routes served by two or more of the partners with connecting
service, when one airline is the marketing airline it must sell seats on flights operated by the partner airline
for the same fares it charges for its own flights or for the fares established by the operating airline. On
routes where one airline offers nonstop service and the other airline offers connecting service, the latter
airline’s fares for the nonstop service must be the same as the operating carrier’s fares. See Termination
of Review Under 49 U.S.C. 41720 of Delta/Northwest/Continental Agreements, 68 Fed. Reg. 16854 n.1
(Apr. 7, 2003), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2003/04/07/03-8288/termination-ofreview-under-49-usc-41720-of-deltanorthwestcontinental-agreements. The stated purpose of the
restrictions is to prevent such pricing practices from becoming a vehicle for signaling and collusion.
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Alliances and code-sharing can also raise vertical issues. Most airlines
are both competitors and customers of other airlines. When two airlines are
both offering to sell a seat to the same passenger to travel between the same
cities, they are direct horizontal competitors. When those same two airlines
interline connecting passengers with one another, they are in essence buying
and selling through passengers to one another and are, thus, in a vertical
relationship. When two vertically related airlines enter an alliance or code
share agreement, other airlines that had previously obtained interline
passengers from one of the alliance parties might find that the alliance
partners favor each other to such an extent that they can no longer obtain
connecting interline passengers on the same terms. Competition laws treat
this as an “exclusive dealing” situation. Exclusive dealing is usually, but not
always, permissible under the antitrust laws.
In the international context, for example, it is possible that in some
gateway-to-gateway markets, carriers must be able to obtain a minimum
number of interline passengers from behind the gateway cities in order for
their gateway-to-gateway leg to be economically viable. If, as a result of an
alliance or code-share agreement, a competitor of one of the partners was
forced to exit the gateway-to-gateway route, fares on that route could
increase, in turn harming consumers and raising “vertical foreclosure”
concerns under competition laws. Whether a particular alliance agreement
would constitute illegal foreclosure depends on many factors, including other
sources of connecting passengers and the efficiencies generated by the
alliance. Although competition authorities have not challenged airline
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alliances on vertical grounds in the past, the possibility remains.
Not only have authorities shown a lack of interest in airline foreclosure
cases, a private antitrust case that raised foreclosure issues failed. Virgin
Atlantic tried to challenge British Airways’ use of contracts with travel
agencies and corporate clients that awarded increased loyalty discounts when
certain sales thresholds were reached.65 Virgin had argued that these contracts
prevented or delayed (i.e., foreclosed) its entry on certain city pair routes.
The court rejected Virgin’s claims on multiple grounds, including that Virgin
had failed to show harm to competition on the routes in question, such as
higher fares, lower output, or reduced service quality.66
C. Antitrust Immunity for International Alliances

V. REMEDIES
USDOJ has no authority to disapprove a merger or enjoin alleged
anticompetitive conduct on its own; rather, it must file a lawsuit seeking relief
from a federal district court.71 Section 4 of the Sherman Act and Section 15

65
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Virgin Atlantic Airways v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 264.
67 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
68 49 U.S.C. § 41308(c) (1994) (emphasis added); 49 U.S.C. § 41309(c)(2) (1996).
69 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1) (1996).
70 Final Order at 7-8, Joint Application of American Airlines, Inc., (July 20, 2010) (No. DOT-OST208-0252), available at http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostpdf78/834.pdf.
71 Post-complaint, USDOJ may seek additional discovery through interrogatories, requests for
admissions, document requests, and depositions pursuant to the usual discovery tools provided to plaintiffs
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These tools are in addition to USDOJ’s pre-complaint
66
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Agreements between and among domestic and foreign airlines are
eligible for statutory antitrust immunity (ATI) under 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308-09.
USDOT is responsible for deciding whether such an agreement meets the
statutory requirements for immunity. The Secretary may grant ATI upon a
finding that the agreement is “required by the public interest.”67 Moreover,
the Secretary shall grant ATI to any agreement that “substantially reduces or
eliminates competition”68 if the Secretary also determines that the agreement
“is necessary to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important
public benefits (including international comity and foreign policy
considerations),” and the “transportation need cannot be met or those benefits
cannot be achieved by reasonably available alternatives that are materially
less anticompetitive.”69 USDOT has described the process as a two-step
analysis starting with the competitive analysis, followed by the benefits
analysis, with the burden on opponents to show competitive harm, and on the
parties to demonstrate countervailing benefits.70
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investigatory powers.
72 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (June 2011) at 5, available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf.
73 Id. at 25.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 13.
76 See generally Complaint, United States v. US Airways Group, Inc. (No. 1:13-CV-012360)
(D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. v. US/AA].
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of the Clayton Act confer jurisdiction on federal district courts “to prevent
and restrain violations” of the antitrust laws by injunction and authorize the
government “to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations.” In fashioning relief, courts may enjoin repetition of past
violations and seek to restore competitive conditions. The equitable merger
remedies potentially available to USDOJ include preliminary or permanent
injunctive relief preventing the consolidation, divestiture of assets, and
behavioral relief.
In merger cases, USDOJ prefers “structural” remedies such as asset
divestiture, which once accomplished, require no further oversight.
According to its Policy Guide To Merger Remedies, USDOJ “will pursue a
divestiture remedy in the vast majority of cases involving horizontal
mergers.”72 Although it is common for merger consent decrees to allow
parties to consummate their merger and accomplish the divestiture afterward,
the time allowed to do so is limited. “Generally, the [USDOJ] will allow the
parties an opportunity to find a purchaser on their own within sixty to ninety
days,”73 but USDOJ always reserves the right to approve any proposed
purchaser.74 Such post-consummation divestiture decrees are accompanied
by a stipulated “Hold Separate” order requiring the merged firm to preserve
the divestiture assets.
The most common forms of non-structural (“conduct”) relief in merger
cases are information firewalls, nondiscrimination requirements, mandatory
licensing, transparency provisions, anti-retaliation provisions, as well as
prohibitions on certain contracting practices.75
Boilerplate provisions generally contained in USDOJ decrees include
provisions terminating the challenged conduct, requiring specific compliance
efforts, arranging for periodic compliance reports, and permitting inspection
of company records. USDOJ decrees are almost always limited in duration,
most often ten years.
The most recent example of a USDOJ enforcement action in the airline
industry occurred in 2013. After a six-month investigation, USDOJ, along
with five states and the District of Columbia, filed a lawsuit in August 2013
alleging that the merger of American Airlines and US Airways, if
implemented, would violate Section 7 and should be enjoined.76 USDOJ
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pointed to fare and fee increases and capacity reductions that had followed
recent industry consolidation.77
American and US Airways had seventeen nonstop overlapping routes,78
but USDOJ’s analysis gave considerable weight to other factors as well.
According to USDOJ, “[t]he merger would create the largest airline in the
world and result in four airlines [American, United, Delta, and Southwest]
controlling eighty percent of the United States commercial air travel
market.”79 It alleged that adverse competitive impacts would be felt in “more
than a thousand routes where one or both offer connecting service,”80 and at
Washington National Airport, where “the combined firm would control 69%
of the slots,” substantially raising barriers to entry.81 USDOJ claimed that
fares and ancillary fees would rise, citing the likely termination of US
Airways’ discount Advantage Fares and the increased likelihood of
coordinated behavior.82 It also contended that there were insufficient
“acquisition-specific and cognizable efficiencies” to offset the alleged
adverse competitive effects,83 and that, far from being a “failing firm,”
American was “likely to exit bankruptcy as a vigorous competitor” in the
absence of the merger.84
On November 12, 2013, USDOJ announced that it had reached an
agreement with the parties that would settle the lawsuit.85 Under the terms of
the settlement, which was set forth in a Proposed Final Judgment filed in the
district court the same day, the parties would divest slots, gates and related
facilities at both Washington National (104 slots, up to five gates and related
ground facilities) and New York LaGuardia (34 slots and up to two gates and
related ground facilities) Airports. In addition, the parties also agreed to
divest two gates and related facilities at five key airports: Boston Logan,
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Id. ¶ 4, at 4; id. ¶ 35 at 14.
Id. ¶ 82 at 30. The 17 nonstop overlaps were fewer than the number of nonstop overlaps between
Southwest and AirTran, whose merger USDOJ did not challenge in 2011.
79 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit Challenging
Proposed Merger Between US Airways and American Airlines (Aug. 13, 2013), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/299960.htm
80 Complaint, U.S. v. US/AA, ¶ 82 at 30.
81 Id. ¶¶ 83, 84 at 30.
82 See generally id. ¶¶ 41-67 at 15-26; see generally id. ¶¶ 71-81 at 27-30. US Airways offers
Advantage Fares on many connecting routes in competition with nonstop fares offered by legacy carriers.
According to USDOJ, these fares “have proven highly disruptive to the industry’s overall coordinated
pricing dynamic,” id. ¶ 54 at 21, i.e., they have disciplined fares for nonstop service by the legacy carriers.
83 Id. ¶ 94 at 33.
84 Press Release, supra note 79.
85 See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires US Airways
and American Airlines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance System-Wide Competition
and Settle Merger Challenge (Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2013/301616.htm.
78
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Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles International, and Miami
International. The carriers purchasing the divestiture assets had to be
approved by USDOJ, which stated that it intended to give preference to
carriers not already operating a large number of flights at the airports in
question.86 The Proposed Final Judgment required the parties to first offer to
Southwest and JetBlue the slots each was currently leasing from American at
LaGuardia Airport (LGA) (10 slots to Southwest) and Washington National
(16 slots to JetBlue.)87 Thereafter, the remaining slots would be divested to
at least two carriers at Washington National and one at LaGuardia.88 The slots
were to be divested within 90 days and the gates and facilities within 180
days.89 Consistent with USDOJ practice, a Divestiture Trustee would be
appointed to carry out the divestitures if the parties failed to do so.90 The
parties are prohibited from re-acquiring the divested assets during the term
of the Proposed Final Judgment, which is ten years, also a standard
provision.91 The Proposed Final Judgment was entered by the court on April
25, 2014, as the Final Judgment without modification.
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See Proposed Final Judgment at IV.A; id.
See Part IV.F, G.
Id.
See id. Part IV.C-D.
See id. Part V.A.
See id. Parts XII, XVI.
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